OSINT researchers from Frontelligence Insight have played a crucial role in uncovering how Russia continues to bypass Western sanctions to produce its Su-57 fighter jets. Their investigation has exposed procurement schemes for high-tech equipment crucial for creating critical components of these Su-57 aircraft.
Russian companies have shown remarkable adaptability and resilience in the production of the Su-57 jets. They have effectively utilized dual-purpose goods that are formally available on the civilian market, demonstrating their resourcefulness in the face of sanctions. A prime example of this resourcefulness is Mikropribor, a company that successfully acquired equipment for automated workstations used for calibrating and testing MPPU-50 devices, which are crucial in satellite communication and radar systems.
The researchers also noted that in July 2022, just a few months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the country signed a contract to supply a Siemens KLE 360 machine — a high-precision German CNC (computer numerical control) machine. This contract underscores the deep interdependence of the Russian military-industrial complex on Western technologies, despite its claims of independence and self-sufficiency.
Tools like the German MPPU-50 play a vital role in calibrating and testing these communication systems. They are crucial in ensuring that the aircraft can maintain stable connections in combat scenarios, where communication reliability is not just important, but absolutely essential.
The production of Russia’s state-of-the-art Su-57 fighter jets is significantly dependent on the supply of Western microelectronics and production equipment. These technologies play a crucial role in the production process, underscoring their significant contribution to the Russian defense industry.
Frontelligence Insight reported on this based on the correspondence exposed by the Russian military electronics manufacturer Mikropribor.
In August 2022, the head of the procurement department of the OJSC Krasnoe Znamya Plant (Almaz-Antey concern) and the management of Mikropribor requested a list of the necessary equipment. The equipment is part of the automated workstations for testing and calibrating the MPPU-50 product.
MPPU-50 is a radio receiver element operating in the L—and X-bands. It is used for satellite communications and radar.
Although the Su-57 has been presented as an unparalleled flying aircraft, leaks suggest that Russia is forced to seek ways around sanctions to achieve the claimed performance. Western components doubt Russia’s ability to produce modern fighter jets entirely independently.
In collaboration with a non-profit, anti-corruption body, Ukrainian journalists have successfully assembled a list that sheds light on the extensive usage of hardware supplied by American firms in the Russian fighter jet production by Sukhoi. Specifically, the components were sourced from Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, and Japanese Murata Manufacturing.
Murata’s Radiation Interference Solution (Radisol) is a device that suppresses interference between antennas in close proximity to each other to improve their characteristics.
Modern avionics, radar systems, and other high-tech components are crucial for combat effectiveness, which underscores Russia’s commitment to securing these parts—even if it means circumventing restrictions. According to the data, the customer intended to fill three positions by the end of 2022.
The list includes foreign-made components such as the WA36 attenuator, EA-PS 3150, and PLR7 60-12 power supplies.
According to the report, imported components play an integral role in various aspects of the aircraft, including its navigation and missile guidance systems and electronic warfare and communication systems. Aircraft models Su-27, Su-30, Su-34, and Su-35 purportedly rely on these components, with the report suggesting the same for the Su-57 fighter model.
In particular, the Kazakh ARC Group fraudulently purchased military equipment from the French companies Thales, and Safran, allegedly for Kazakh fighter jets, but installed them on Russian Su-30SMs.
In addition, specialists were trained abroad in the same way, and they later worked at Russian aircraft manufacturing companies and serviced Russian aircraft.
Circumventing Sanctions
In Georgia, the investigative outlet iFact published findings of suspicious patterns in an article titled “How Georgia Facilitates Russia’s Military Supply Chain.” To compile their report, journalists posed as individuals interested in shipping so-called “dual-use” goods to Russia from Georgia. In conversations with couriers, they found that there were few barriers to sending such goods to Russia, such as drones and computer processors, items that can serve both civilian and military purposes.
The documents collected in the investigation cover the past two years, revealing that Russia’s defense industry operates with strategic precision. However, it does not always succeed in “covering its tracks” when making these sanction-evasive purchases. With limited human and resource capacity, Russian companies are forced to prioritize and conceal only the most critical operations, underscoring the gravity of the situation.
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