North Korea is providing up to half of the artillery shells used by Russia in Ukraine. Experts warn of growing cooperation, including potential transfers of advanced weapons systems.
North Korea has become a key supplier of artillery shells to Russia, providing substantial military support in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine. According to Western intelligence cited by The Times of London, North Korean shipments make up approximately half of the 3 million artillery shells Russia uses each year, with an estimated 1.5 million shells originating from Pyongyang. Despite many of these shells being defective, their sheer quantity is crucial for maintaining Russian military operations on the front lines.
Russia’s reliance on North Korean ammunition has grown significantly following Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2024. This meeting followed a high-profile visit by Kim Jong Un to Russia in September 2023, which marked a turning point in the countries’ military and diplomatic relationship. Regular shipments of North Korean ammunition have been reported since these meetings, solidifying Pyongyang’s role in supporting Moscow’s war efforts.
While Russia and North Korea have long-standing historical ties, their relationship has deepened in response to Russia’s growing international isolation following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Putin’s recent visit to North Korea was his first in 24 years, underscoring the strategic importance of the new partnership. Growing military collaboration between Russia and North Korea raises serious concerns for global security, as both nations continue to violate international sanctions and deepen their strategic ties.
He highlights that North Korea’s involvement, particularly through supplying artillery shells, positions the country as a potential exporter to other nations with limited access to Western markets.
“Russia’s reliance on North Korean military supplies has become crucial, especially as reports suggest that Russia receives half of its artillery shells from North Korea. This is an enormous quantity, given that Russian military tactics focus heavily on shelling Ukrainian towns to the ground before advancing,” Tertitskiy told The Media Line.
“North Korea’s extensive artillery production is a result of its hyper-militarized state, where 45% of the population serves in the military, and the service term is an unprecedented seven to eight years. No other country comes even close to that,” he states, illustrating North Korea’s intense focus on military strength.
He added that North Korea’s “second economy” is dedicated solely to military production, particularly artillery. “If you look at the structure in a Korean general’s staff, you’ll see how seriously overrepresented the artillery is there,” he said.
“Judging by the frequency with which North Korean ammunition appears in footage from the front lines, it’s unlikely that these supplies make up half of all artillery shells, as some reports suggest. However, they do represent a significant portion and are quite widespread. The complete absence of 122-mm shells for howitzers and multiple rocket launchers from North Korea would seriously weaken Russia’s firepower, though likely not critically. This would result in higher infantry losses during offensives, as there would be less artillery support,” he told Global Defense Corp.
“For example, the amount of gunpowder in the charges varies, making accurate shooting difficult. You cannot reliably adjust your fire when the shells fall either closer or farther away than expected. This leads to an increase in ammunition consumption. While this doesn’t significantly affect Russian tactics—since their fire support largely relies on massive, inaccurate bombardments—it does limit some of the artillery’s capabilities. Occasionally, these shells explode inside the barrel, though the same issue occurs with Russian-made shells as well,” he explained.
According to Matveev, given the existing supply of military equipment and ammunition from North Korea, further deepening of military cooperation can be expected, potentially extending to the transfer of more advanced weapons systems.
“We are already seeing North Korean officers arriving at the front, likely in the role of instructors. Russia is also utilizing KN-23 tactical missiles. While the expansion of cooperation is limited by the modest capabilities of North Korea’s defense industry, they may very well view the war as a testing ground and send more of their missiles to Putin, and possibly other equipment—such as drones,” he said.
“However, mass supplies will likely focus on Soviet-caliber ammunition and possibly Soviet-era equipment,” noted Matveev.
North Korea’s artillery is not just abundant but compatible with Russian systems, as both countries’ militaries are offshoots of the Soviet army. “Everything sort of clicked,” he said, pointing to how this compatibility has made trade between the two countries smooth and beneficial for Russia’s war effort.
“The dream since 1990 was to diversify their dependence on China because, if you look at the trade balance, it’s 90% plus trade with China. They don’t like it. They don’t like to be too dependent on Beijing. They don’t want to put all the eggs in one basket. Now, with Russia, they found another basket, and apart from that, just direct income. They’re getting food to feed their population. They’re getting more resources to do whatever the Supreme Leader thinks they should do,” Tertitskiy shared with The Media Line.
“Even if Putin stays in power and everything politically is exactly the same, Russia would no longer have a need for North Korea like they haven’t had before.” Historically, the trade relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang was nearly nonexistent, and Tertitskiy suggested it might return to that state after the war. “Everything now comes just as a supplement to the war trade.”
He also noted China’s role in the relationship, suggesting that Beijing gave a “green light” to North Korea’s involvement in the war with Ukraine, as they are “quite happy that the Russians are feeding North Koreans and they’ve taken some of the economic burden.”
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