“While Russia is unlikely to retaliate against any large-scale Turkish offensive in northern Syria, it will likely step up its effort to evacuate from Syria.”
Russian troops in northern Syria gradually withdrew from the city of Tal Rifaat to consolidate their position, sources said Thursday.
The Russian forces are also trying to relocate a defense system at Qamishli Airport in the northern Hassakeh province, which is largely under the occupation of the PKK terrorist organization’s Syrian offshoot, the YPG.
Due to its alliance with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and military presence in northern Syria, Russia views Turkey’s potential offensive against the SDF with concern. To prevent a Turkish intervention, Russia has blended diplomacy and deterrence.
Despite Moscow’s desire to avoid an escalation, the risk of a major Russia-Turkey confrontation in Syria remains minimal, even if Erdogan opts for a sweeping ground operation. Instead, Russia might try to capitalise on an offensive by encouraging greater cooperation between the SDF and Assad.
Russian military helicopters have been conducting intermittent reconnaissance flights over the YPG/PKK-occupied Tal Rifaat since the beginning of the week. The Russian forces are also trying to prevent an attack on Russian forces in Tal Rifaat.
Moreover, Russian authorities did not allow Iranians who wanted to attend a meeting with regime officials and the YPG/PKK ringleaders on May 30.
On the same day, with Grad missile launchers, Russian soldiers did not let Iranian-backed terrorist groups enter Tal Rifaat from Nubl and al-Zahraa towns, located southwest of Tal Rifaat and are under the control of the Bashar al-Assad regime.
When the Iran-backed groups attempted to enter the Menagh military air base on May 31, Russian forces warned the terrorist group and the regime not to allow the groups to enter the area.
Russian forces are normally deployed in a place known as Faisal Mill, 3 kilometers (1.9 miles) west of Tal Rifaat.
A small number of Russian military units are stationed at the airport that remains under the control of the Assad regime in the town of Qamishli, which is largely under the occupation of YPG/PKK in the Hassakeh province.
The Russian army, which landed at the airport with a military cargo plane on Friday, brought the Pantsir-S1 short and medium-range air defense system.
On the other hand, there has been an increase in the number of Russian soldiers in Ain Isa, Tal Tamr, Manbij, Ain al-Arab and the Qamishli regions of Syria.
Russia, which rented Khmeimim Air Base from Syria, also uses the naval facility at Tarsus, a Syrian city on the Mediterranean coast.
Why a Russia-Turkey escalation remains unlikely
Despite the close proximity of Russian and Turkish forces in northern Syria, a major military escalation between the two powers remains unlikely. Both sides will seek to avoid a repeat of the 27 February 2020 Balyun airstrikes, which saw Russia kill up to 34 Turkish troops and resulted in Turkey’s one-week Operation Spring Shield offensive in Idlib.
This does not preclude asymmetric Russian airstrikes in Idlib, such as those that occurred in early October. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) has alerted itself to the prospect of intensified Russian bombings to encourage a last-ditch rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.
However, an overarching desire for deconfliction endures. Even if Turkey’s offensive in northern Syria is more expansive and longer lasting than previous campaigns, Russia is unlikely to deepen its military involvement for three reasons.
First, Russia’s overall military presence in Syria has noticeably ebbed since its invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February. On 19 October, The New York Times reported that Russia withdrew an S-300 air defence system from Syria and paired this removal with the exit of a portion of its ground troop contingent.
“Russia’s overall military presence in Syria has noticeably ebbed since its invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February”
Israeli satellite intelligence corroborates this report, as it shows that Russia’s S-300 system in Masyaf was transferred to Novorossiyk, Ukraine via Tartous in August 2022. The enduring momentum of Ukraine’s counter-offensive suggests that Russia is unlikely to undo this redeployment or intensify airstrikes in Syria, which are already at their lowest levels since Assad requested Russian assistance in September 2015.
Second, Russian hardline commentators, who have shaped Putin’s approach to the Ukraine war in recent months, view the SDF in a very negative light. A 22 November post on the influential Rybar Telegram channel accused the SDF of abetting the spread of terrorism in Syria, which it blamed on Turkey, Russia and the US, and of using the pretext of fighting the Islamic State (IS) to extract financial aid from the US.
On 27 November, former Kremlin advisor Sergei Markov claimed that Russia tacitly approves of Turkey’s intervention in Syria provided that it weakens “pro-American Kurds” and does not threaten Assad’s grip on power. This suggests that the Kremlin is unlikely to take action that aids the SDF, even if it views Turkey’s actions as destabilising.
Third, Russia views Turkey as an increasingly important partner due to its resistance to Western sanctions and mediation role in the Ukraine War and does not wish to derail Moscow-Ankara cooperation in Idlib.
On 6 June, Lavrov acknowledged the legitimacy of Turkey’s security concerns in Syria, which he attributed to “separatist sentiments” fuelled by “illegally present” US forces. Lavrov has repeatedly vowed to uphold agreements between Russia and Turkey on a Syria settlement and insisted that they are making slow but steady progress.
The continuation of Russia-Turkey joint patrols in Kobani, even after Ankara angered Moscow by blocking the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits to warships on 28 February, underscores the resilience of Russia-Turkey cooperation in Syria.
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