When Vladimir Putin took the reins of power in a post-Soviet Russia in shambles a quarter-century ago, he immediately set about restoring Moscow’s status as a global power.
It took 15 years, but Russia heralded its military intervention in the Syrian civil war as proof of its return as a force to be reckoned with on the international stage.
Moscow leveraged that image to expand its influence throughout the Middle East and beyond as a counterweight to the West.
Now, the fall of the government of President Bashar al-Assad, a key ally of Moscow, has dealt a serious blow to Russia’s great-power ambitions.
“Putin’s military adventure in Syria was designed to demonstrate that Russia is a great power and can project its influence abroad,” said Phillip Smyth, a Middle East expert. “Losing Syria is a huge slap in the face for Putin.”
An anti-government fighter remotely fires rockets against regime forces in the northern outskirts of Syrian city of Hama on December 4.
Assad’s ouster represents not only a reputational hit to Russia but likely a major strategic setback.
Syria is home to two major Russia military installations: an air base in Hmeimim and a naval base in Tartus. The latter is Russia’s only warm-water naval base outside the former Soviet Union and provides Moscow access to the Mediterranean Sea.
“Russia has used its bases in Syria to project its power both into the eastern Mediterranean and into the broader Middle East,” said Smyth.
Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015 changed the tide of the war. Moscow’s devastating aerial campaigns against rebel positions helped the Syrian Army regain swaths of territory and keep Assad in power.
Moscow’s Syria campaign came a year after its invasion of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula as well as its support for separatist forces in Ukraine’s east.
Moscow capitalized on its involvement in both Syria and Ukraine to sell itself as a power capable of challenging the United States, NATO, and the West in general while expanding its global reach from the Mediterranean to Africa and Latin America.
Following Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Syria became more of an asset for Moscow, experts say, while also presenting the challenge of maintaining military campaigns on two fronts.
With the anticipated fall of Russian military assets in Syria, following the collapse of Assad’s government, the task has become even more daunting.
Russia is already heavily invested in a major counteroffensive to regain captured territory in its southwestern Kursk region that it lost to Ukraine, to the point that it is relying on help from North Korean troops. At the same time, it is trying to take as much territory as it can in Ukraine’s east before possible peace talks.
Russia military facilities along the Mediterranean coast in western Syria could be overrun by militants led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, and its allies.
Aaron Zelin, senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said Russia simply does not have the same firepower at its disposal to protect its assets in Syria.
“It is important to remember that Russia has to deal with its larger war in Ukraine now compared to when they first went in Syria in 2015,” said Zelin.
“Russia also has its assets fighting in sub-Saharan Africa, too. And unlike a decade ago, when Russia had the Wagner Group led by [the deceased Yevgeny] Prigozhin … Russia doesn’t have the same level of capacity or capability to deal with this now in the same way.”
Zelin said losing the Tartus naval base, in particular, would be an “extremely huge loss for Russia.”
“It’s Russia’s only warm-water port that it can use for its naval activities and power projection,” he said. “Losing it would essentially cut Russia out of the core of the Middle East.”
Moscow did not send ground troops to help Damascus, which fell to the HTS and its allies on December 8. Russia conducted dozens of air strikes since the militants launched their offensive against Assad’s forces in late November, but Moscow’s limited intervention did little to stop the rebel advance.
Russia will pay a huge price for its failure in Syria, experts say.
The fall of Assad is a “major blow to Russia’s claim of still being a global power in terms of sustaining military and political influence abroad,” said Hamidreza Azizi, fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
From there, actors in other regions such as Latin America and Africa might “start rethinking their ties and their reliance on Russia as well,” he said.
Ankara’s new challenges
In contrast, Turkey has reason for quiet satisfaction. But the overthrow of Assad will bring huge complexities. Turkey is close to al-Jawlani but does not control his forces; the Syrian National Army is more Ankara’s proxy. Until now Turkey has occupied itself mainly with problems close to its border, particularly the perpetual challenge posed by Kurdish fighters seeking autonomy.
The response of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan is… central to the stability or otherwise of the new Syrian regime.
Ankara will now have to concern itself with what is happening in Damascus, in Syria’s south. It will recognize, too, that as an Arab country, Syria’s decisions are shaped by its relations with its Arab neighbours.
The response of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan is therefore central to the stability or otherwise of the new Syrian regime. After years of censuring Assad, they had last year invited Syria back into the Arab League; the Gulf Cooperation Council on 1 December called for the opposition to Assad to back down.
They will now have to pivot to deal with al-Jawlani as well as other forces holding sway over the northeast. The United Arab Emirates, for one, are uncomfortable with the Islamist roots of HTS, although al-Jawlani has taken steps to downplay those in recent days.
Tehran and Moscow’s absence
For Iran, Assad’s fall marks the loss of its ‘land bridge’ to the eastern Mediterranean and a base for its proxies, particularly Hezbollah. Its decision not to send forces to support Assad was one of the most significant moves as the opposition’s takeover unfolded.
It might have reflected a recognition of the fatal weakness of the Assad regime, unpopular even before the sustained economic crisis. It could also illustrate Tehran’s own weakness: Iran and Hezbollah have suffered significant losses in the conflict with Israel.
Whatever government emerges…is expected – for the moment – to respect the deal that Assad struck granting Russia use of a military base on the Syrian coast.
However, it might signal Iran’s pragmatic recognition that it would gain nothing from an intervention – either in its relations with Arab neighbours or with the incoming Trump administration. That may stir further questions about the fragility of the regime in Tehran – although its resilience and ingenuity should not be underestimated.
For Russia, the fall of Assad is a blow whose significance is hard to calibrate. Whatever government emerges in Damascus is expected – for the moment – to respect the deal that Assad struck granting Russia use of a military base on the Syrian coast. But this important asset is vulnerable, and that risks its influence in the region.
Like Tehran, Moscow decided not to support Assad in his final days. That may reflect weakness or simply distraction over Ukraine. While Russia retains extensive influence in the region, it will have to rebuild those networks.
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