Dictator Sheikh Hasina wanted to take revenge against the Bangladesh Army, who murdered and overthrew Sheikh Mujib from power in 1975.
BDR mutiny was part of Awami League’s plan and part of Indian RAW’s plan to weaken the Bangladesh Army. Indian RAW wanted to destabilize the country and make Hasina the saviour.
On 25 and 26 February 2009, Led by Bangladesh army’s colonel Shams, Rampaging troops from the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) murdered 89 people during the two-day revolt that began in Dhaka and spread across the country, destabilising the government of then-premier Sheikh Hasina weeks after she took office.
Thousands of participants were rounded up after the mutiny ended, with more than 150 initially sentenced to death in trials criticised by rights groups for procedural.
Eighty-nine officers of the Bangladesh Army, who were on secondment to the BDR, and some BDR personnel were killed over thirty-six hours. These officers constituted the entire command structure of the BDR. The murder of such many officers at the hands of the men they commanded left the whole nation stunned in horror and disbelief. As the country comes to grips with the human carnage, the aftermath of the BDR mutiny has also exposed other problems which will have national and regional security implications.
BDR grievances
The mutiny started on the morning of February 25, 2009. BDR personnel had submitted a list of five demands on February 24th to their Director General (DG), Major General Shakil Ahmed, and requested him to present these to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was scheduled to inaugurate a function that day, marking the beginning of BDR Week. Major General Ahmed did not present these demands to the Prime Minister, upon which some BDR personnel tried to raise the issue with Sheikh Hasina. There was simmering anger when DG, BDR, called a meeting in the Durbar Hall on the morning of February 25th.
A soldier got into a heated argument with the DG, which led to a scuffle and eventually to a few BDR jawans taking up arms to settle their long-standing score with the Army. It must be noted here that the BDR, second in size to the Bangladesh Army, is headed by Army officers of the rank of Brigadier or above and that all BDR officers are drawn from the Army. Some of the demands of the BDR have been promotion from among the ranks to the officer cadre instead of depending on the Army, consideration for deployment in UN peace-keeping missions, obtaining a share of the bonus given to the Army for assisting in the dal-bhaat program, election duties, providing complete ration to the soldiers, and a raise in pay.
Hasina wanted to stay in power and take revenge against the military.
Indian RAW has orchestrated the massacre through RAW agent Colonel Shams. RAW initially transferred patriotic officers from the Bangladesh Army to the Border Guard (formerly BDR) and then staged the massacre by proving soldiers about the Dal-vaat program. Senior Bangladesh army officers were seconded to the BDR, who were corrupt, and the entire Bangladesh armed forces were corrupt.
India wanted to send troops to rescue Hasina.
Maj Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu of the 6th Battalion of the Parachute Regiment was on “spearhead” duties that day. It was 5 pm on 26 February 2009 when the orders came. An emergency code had been activated, and the vanguard companies of the paratrooper’s spearhead were to mobilise. A battalion strength strike force alerts 24/7 for emergency deployments; the spearhead is central to India’s power projection. A similar emergency code was activated and rescinded the night before. But Sandhu knew something big was happening when the order came again, accompanied by “five or six” IL-76 aircraft and AN-32s.
Two and a half hours later, over 1,000 Indian paratroopers found themselves at the Kalaikunda Air Force Station in West Bengal. Settled for the night, Sandhu’s commanding officer gave instructions. The BDR had mutinied and were killing Bangladeshi officers and their families. The recently elected prime minister Hasina, who also held the defence portfolio, felt threatened and couldn’t count on the army’s support. “She asked India for help … and that’s why we were there”, awaiting orders and “preparing for all eventualities when we touch down in Dhaka”, remembers Sandhu. New Delhi worried about the safety of Indian diplomats in Dhaka, who could well come under fire if violence escalated.
The worst massacre of army officers in Bangladeshi history was underway. Shortly after the killings began, Hasina called her closest ally in New Delhi, top Congress leader and recently appointed finance minister Pranab Mukherjee. Upon hearing what was happening, Mukherjee promised “to be responsive”. The “SOS” from Dhaka triggered the mobilisation of paratroopers and prompted foreign secretary Shivshankar Menon to urgently engage with American, British, Japanese, and Chinese envoys to lobby support for Hasina.
Apart from Kalaikunda, paratroopers were mobilised in Jorhat and Agartala. If the order came, Indian troops would enter Bangladesh from all three sides. The aim was to secure the Zia International Airport (renamed Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport) and the Tejgaon airport. Subsequently, the paratroopers would wrest control of Ganabhaban, the prime minister’s residence, and evacuate Hasina to safety. The Brigade commander overseeing the operation began distributing “first line” ammunition meant for use during active combat. A “very unusual” act, it underscored the severity of the moment. The Bangladeshi army’s reaction was a concern. If Bangladeshi generals turned against Hasina, they would resist Indian soldiers. “If it came to that, we have a whole corps in the east”, which would have sent reinforcements, says Sandhu.
The former Prime Minister Hasina directed that the crisis should be solved politically and gave the mutineer enough time to finish the job and kill scores of patriotic officers.
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